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Previous findings of economic literature pointed out that there is significant
correlation between corruption and trade. However, this study was based on under
developing countries. The model used in this study is similar to the model used by
Wanjala and Pierre‘s gravity model but with few changes in the model.
This study develops and estimates the relationship between corruption and trade among
developing nations and under developing nations. Wanjala and Pierre use the gravity model

to estimate the effect of corruption on trade. In this paper I will use a similar model, but
will not focus on border effects.
Paper concludes that decrease in corruption increases the trade flow. Further
research needs to be done to examine if corruption helps increase in economic growth.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

There is considerable literature on corruption and the effect of corruption on
growth in developing countries. Travares (2005) suggests that democratization plays an
important role in creation of corruption in any particular country. He also suggests that
the longer it takes the country to reform from a non-democratic to a democratized state,
the higher the level of corruption. There is literature on how corruption effects growth in
developing countries, and whether corruption increases or decreases trade.
Many studies suggest that corruption exists due to the reforms taken by the
government. Dai Changzheng (2010) concludes that while China has made many reforms
to combat corruption, it has failed to decrease corruption. Furthermore, he suggests that
the solution is China should become a democratic country to combat corruption. Alan
Heston & Vijay Kumar (Institutional Flaws and Corruption Incentives in India, 2008)
suggest that India has achieved respectable high levels of economic growth, but the
corruption level has also increased with growth. They argue that it’s difficult for India to
achieve its economic potential while the corruption level increases with growth of the
economy.
Jacob Wanjala Musila and Simon Pierre Sigue (2010) conclude that corruption
and international trade are related. They also find that the corruption in African countries
and corruption in their trading partners adversely affects the flow of exports and imports.
Wanjala and Sigue use empirical data to analyze the effect of corruption in African
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nations. They study the effect of the level of corruption in both trading partners – in both
exporting and importing countries.
In this paper I will estimate the effect of corruption on a few of the largest and
fastest growing economies in South Asia and Southeast Asia. Wanjala and Pierre use the
gravity model to estimate the effect of corruption on trade. In this paper I will use a
similar model, but will not focus on border effects.
In Section 2, I will explain corruption in the selected Asian countries for the
model. In Section 3 I will explain how corruption affects trade in Asian countries. Section
4 will explain the methodology and the data used to estimate the model. Section 5 will
show reports of the estimation and Section 6 will give the conclusions of the model.
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CHAPTER 2
CORRUPTION IN ASIAN COUNTRIES

Asia consists of the world’s largest and fastest-growing economies. Asia also
has the highest population in the world. I have chosen the following Asian countries,
which include a mix of developed and developing economies: Bangladesh, India, China,
Hong Kong, Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia.
“If you want to buy a Sherman tank, a Red Cross blanket, or simply speed up the
installation of a telephone, there is probably no easier place in the world in which to do
just that than in Asia – if you are willing to part with some cash, that is. With pathetically
few exceptions, the countries in this region are so riddled with corruption that the paying
of ‘tea money’ has become almost a way of life” (Far East Economic Review, 1974, 3).
India has the second largest population. Its ranking has dropped to 87 (out of 178)
in being one of the more corrupted countries. Corruption is way of life. For example,
opening an internet café would take more time if one follows procedure to get a permit
from the government. The process goes much faster if officials are bribed. .
Riley (1998) classifies corruption in African societies into three categoriesincidental, systematic and systemic. Incidental corruption is petty corruption like
watching pirated movies, which only affects the profits of movie makers. Other examples
include individual government employees or police. Border police taking bribes and
allowing goods to be smuggled illegally will affect that particular goods market.
Systematic corruption is more pervasive, because it includes government
organizations. For example construction contractors who bid to get a contract would
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bribe the government organizations, then – in order to cover cost bribery – they decrease
the quality of construction materials.
Systemic corruption is organized corruption which involves the government,
where it is irrational to be honest because being corrupt is the only way to live. Examples
of countries with systemic corruption are Sierra Leone and Zaire. In Sierra Leone’s case,
systemic corruption was associated with President Siaka Stevens’ one-man rule of 1968–
85 and the one-party All People’s Congress regime that lasted until 1992. These
corruption cases involved extensive theft of government revenues, which were mainly
generated through official and smuggled export trade in diamonds, gold, other minerals
and agricultural produce. Another example: the famous Bofors Gun Scandal in India,
where the late Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was accused of receiving kickbacks up to
Rs.400 million from Bofors AB.
These types of corruption are more or less found in every developing country. In
the international business arena, corruption is more difficult to define and control, since
the perception of right and wrong (both morally and legally) tends to vary extensively
from culture to culture (Wines and Napier, 1992). Corruption varies from culture to
culture: for instance in Africa, South Asia and South east Asia, corruption is similar but
occurs at different levels of organization. Habib Zafarullah and Noorealsam Siddique
(2001), suggest that corruption in the public sector in Bangladesh does not work in
isolation: it is fostered by corrupt acts of political leaders in power. The politicians in
Bangladesh are believed to be involved in large-scale corruption – which is
administrative corruption or systemic corruption.
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CHAPTER 3
CORRUPTION TRADE NEXUS

Recent literature suggests that corruption can affect international trade in many
different ways. In some areas, it can actually improve trade, but it is not healthy for the
economic growth. Corruption can also impact investment or FDI. According to Drabek
and Payne 2001, and Smarzynska and Wei (2000), advanced firms are less willing to
invest in a country where corruption is high.
There are many papers on the relationship between corruption and international
trade. Some researchers have shown that corruption reduces total capital imports
(Lambsdorff, 1999). A few researchers (Bai and Wei, 2001) also suggest that more
corrupt countries are more likely to impose capital controls as government’s ability to
collect tax revenue decreases. Some suggest that capital controls may breed corruption
(Edwards 1999).
Channels through which corruption effects trade include the efficiency channel,
transactions cost or price mark-up, and contract awarding. The efficiency channel can
improve economic growth, or it might backfire and impede economic growth. An
example: bribing officials to speed up the permit process to open a liquor bar. This type
of corruption helps the economy grow. Leff (1964) and Huntington (1968) suggest that
efficiency channel corruption will make the government officials work harder, and also
suggest that bribes can bypass bureaucratic delays. This can backfire, if those same
officials have taken bribes to delay the process. Myrdal (1968) suggests that corrupt
government officials can also create unwanted bureaucratic delays in order to get more
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bribes. Kaufman and Wei (1999) suggest that firms that pay more bribes are likely to
spend more time managing bureaucrats in negotiating deals, which results in higher cost
of capital.
In the case of transaction cost or price mark-up channel, Shleifer and Visny(1993)
and Bardhan (1997) suggest that government agents may levy bribes that are lower than
the official tax. In such cases, shipments can get into the country at a lower transaction
cost. This decreased cost will reduce the price of that good and will in turn increase trade.
In other situations, agents might levy taxes higher than the government taxes, which will
impact prices and decrease trade. This kind of corruption is found more with customs
officials at airports or harbors. In these situations, exporters and importers will be forced
to make an extra payment to the agent, which is tantamount to a monthly salary for the
agent. If exporters and importers do not pay the extra tax to the agent, then there is a good
chance the shipment will be lost. In order to cover this tax, the exporter or the importer
has to increase the price of goods, which will in turn decrease the demand for that good
and will decrease trade.
The third channel is the contract-awarding channel, where the contractors or the
dealers pay the bribe in order to get the contract from the government. One good example
is the Bofors Gun Scandal in India, where Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was accused of
taking an award of Rs. Rs.400 million. This demonstrates that exporting and importing
firms are willing to engage in corrupt practices and to gain advantage over those who
cannot afford to pay bribes.
Jacob Wanjala and Simon Pierre have studied Africa – a continent with more than
45 countries rich in natural resources, but with a high level of corruption. They have used
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47 African countries with 180 trading partners to test the effect of corruption on trade. I
am choosing seven countries from Asia which have similar cultural beliefs and diversity.
These Asian countries have been colonized by Britain and have diverse populations.
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CHAPTER 4
DATA DESCRIPTION

The countries that I have selected are Bangladesh, India, China, Hong Kong,
Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. These seven countries have backgrounds similar to
African nations. Countries like India, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand
have diverse cultures, and these cultures have different definitions of corruption. China
and Hong Kong have the same government but different trade policies.
I have several reasons for choosing these countries: Asian countries represent
60% of the world's population; while India and China combined represent 37% of world's
population. In terms of economic development, India and China have the largest
economies. Singapore is a developed country with relatively low corruption (compared to
other Asian countries.)
One of the main reasons for selecting these countries is that all these countries
export similar goods and also import similar goods. These countries export most of their
goods to developed countries and there is considerable competition between countries for
these markets. According to UNCTAD, China exported ICT goods valued at $356 billion
in 2009, followed by Hong Kong with $142 billion. The United States tops the list of ICT
importers. India's exports increased by a dramatic 244% and Malaysia by 18%.
Countries like India and Malaysia have high corruption but are still able to increase trade
with countries which are among the least corrupted or are only moderately corrupted.
Lambsdorff (1998) and Anderson and Marcouiller (1999) both have used the
gravity equation formulation in their cross-country analyses. The gravity equation treats
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corruption as a trade deterrent or catalyst variable. This will allow both the possibilities:
that corruption can increase, or corruption can decrease trade between a pair of countries.
The main question is if corruption increases or decreases trade flow in Asian countries.
According to the gravity model of bilateral trade, the flow of trade is related to the size of
and distance between the trading partners. The combined effect of the size and distance
factors can be expressed as the product of the output of the two trading partners, divided
by the distance between them. In this paper, the gravity parameter is calculated as the
product of the gross domestic product of trading partners, divided by the distance
between them.
Jacob and Simone’s model consists of other factors: common geographic border,
common language (CL) as cultural factor, and common currency and regional trade
agreements (RTA) as regulatory factors. In this paper, I have ignored some of the
parameters like common border, regional trade agreements, and common currency. These
are more applicable for African nations as all the countries are in one continent and most
of these countries have different tribal languages and also have regional trade
agreements. The countries selected for this paper are more globalized and have a high
flow of trade volume, which shows that they have flexible trade agreements and have less
border effect.
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CHPATER 5
METHODOLOGY OF ESTIMATIONS

I have focused on gravity parameter, common language (cultural differences) and
corruption. The equation used in this paper is more simplistic than Jacob and Simone's
paper, as the countries selected for this paper are only seven and do not share the same
factors that affect trade. The focus of this paper is to test the effect of corruption in south
Asia and Southeast Asian countries using the gravity model.
Equation I
Log(imports) = β +β1log(gravity)+ β2 Cl(common language) + β3CF ( Freedom
from corruption).

Equation II
Log(Exports) = β +β1log(gravity)+ β2 Cl(common language) + β3CF ( Freedom
from corruption).
I have tested these equations for each individual country (Parent Country:
Bangladesh, India, China, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore). Imports are
all the imports from parent countries to their trading partners and exports are all exports
from the parent country to their trading partners. Gravity is the product of GDP in current
billion dollars of parent countries to their trading partners. For measurement of corruption
I have used the freedom from corruption parameter from the Heritage Foundation.
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Corruption erodes economic freedom by introducing insecurity and uncertainty
into economic relationships. The score for this component is derived primarily from
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) for 2009, which
measures the level of corruption in 180 countries. The CPI is based on a 10-point scale in
which a score of 10 indicates very little corruption and a score of 0 indicates a very
corrupt government. In scoring freedom from corruption, the Index converts the raw CPI
data to a scale of 0 to 100 by multiplying the CPI score by 10. For example, if a country’s
raw CPI data score is 5.5, its overall freedom from corruption score is 55. I estimate the
empirical model in Equation 1 using annual data for the period 1996 to 2006 of seven
south Asian and southeast Asian countries, to and from 66 trading partners. The nominal
GDP is obtained from International Financial Statistics /International Monetary Fund's
World Economic Outlook Database. The export and import data (in millions of dollars)
are obtained from the International Monetary Fund's Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS)
yearbooks.
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CHAPTER 6
ESTIMATION OUTPUTS AND CONCLUSION

I have used the basic estimation technique (i.e. ordinary least squares method) and
have estimated the data for each country for each year – which showed different results.
The results of specific years showed that for certain years, there is a positive relationship
between gravity and trade, and for certain years it showed that there is negative
relationship. Since we have used freedom of corruption (assuming there is positive
relationship between trade and freedom of corruption), then it means that less corruption
will lead to more trade. I have tested the average data for ten years for each parent
country and the results indicate that there is a positive relationship between flow of trade,
and gravity, and freedom from corruption. The empirical analysis shows that corruption
decreases trade, and corruption is trade barrier.
For Bangladesh, estimation of Equation 1 shows that there is a positive
relationship between trade and these three factors: distance, common language, freedom
from corruption. If freedom from corruption increases, then flow of imports increases.
But for exports, increase in distance would decrease the flow of exports.
For China, the estimation of Equation I show that there is a negative relationship
between language and imports, which indicates that not having a common language, is
barrier. Estimation for the countries of India, Malaysia and Thailand have indicated that a
decrease in corruption will increase the flow of trade.
The hypothesis is that corruption decreases trade. We fail to reject the hypothesis,
because estimation for all our selected countries shows that decrease in corruption

13
increases the flow of trade. However there are examples which show that corruption can
increase unilateral trade. For example, consider two firms: firm A (foreign country) and
firm B (home country) in an open economy with single good market. Firm A (from a
foreign company) can bribe the government officials in the home country, and export its
goods into the home country. This will increase the imports of this product in the home
country. In this case (assuming that firm A is more efficient than firm B), firm B will shut
down and this will affect the welfare of the home country. Unless the government of
home country enacts policies which will help firm B to survive in this situation, it will be
difficult for firm B to stay in the market.
However more research needs to be done on such cases to show that corruption
improves trade but is bad the for the country’s economy. There could be many other cofactors like literacy rate or poverty, which encourage corruption to effect flow of trade.
Further research needs to done on these factors and co-factors.
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Table 1
Bangladesh Imports and Exports
Dependent Variable: LOG(IMPORT)
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 05/05/11 Time: 11:16
Sample: 1996 2006 IF IMPORT>0 AND BANGLADESH_GRAVITY >0
Periods included: 11
Cross-sections included: 41
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 370
Variable
C
LOG(BANGLADESH_GRAVITY)
COMMON_LANGUAGE
CORRUPTION_FREEDOM
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

2.461591
0.045079
3.180944
0.049051

0.743725
0.126299
0.411618
0.005311

3.309813
0.356926
7.727909
9.236565

0.0010
0.7214
0.0000
0.0000

0.249194
0.243040
2.515250
2315.493
-864.2741
40.49201
0.000000

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
Hannan-Quinn criter.
Durbin-Watson stat

5.286872
2.890977
4.693373
4.735682
4.710179
0.058194

Dependent Variable: LOG(EXPORTS)
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 05/05/11 Time: 11:21
Sample: 1996 2006 IF EXPORTS>0 AND BANGLADESH_GRAVITY >0
Periods included: 11
Cross-sections included: 44
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 414
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

C
LOG(BANGLADESH_GRAVITY
)
COMMON_LANGUAGE
CORRUPTION_FREEDOM

0.365446

0.700705

0.521539

0.6023

-0.320165
1.589603
0.048157

0.119752
0.396493
0.004911

-2.673558
4.009159
9.805356

0.0078
0.0001
0.0000

R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

0.213712
0.207959
2.491558
2545.224
-963.3749
37.14592
0.000000

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
Hannan-Quinn criter.
Durbin-Watson stat

4.719016
2.799608
4.673309
4.712206
4.688691
0.064641
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Table 2
China (Imports and Exports)
Dependent Variable: LOG(IMPORT)
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 05/05/11 Time: 11:16
Sample: 1996 2006 IF IMPORT>0 AND CHINAMAIN_GRAVITY >0
Periods included: 11
Cross-sections included: 52
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 461
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

C
LOG(CHINAMAIN_GRAVIT
Y)
COMMON_LANGUAGE
CORRUPTION_FREEDOM

5.386524

0.088057

61.17075

0.0000

0.837100
-0.791523
0.010090

0.011081
0.092871
0.001377

75.54655
-8.522779
7.325148

0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

0.944922
0.944561
0.637770
185.8849
-444.7743
2613.455
0.000000

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
Hannan-Quinn criter.
Durbin-Watson stat

4.723198
2.708664
1.946960
1.982825
1.961082
0.038531

Dependent Variable: LOG(EXPORTS)
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 05/05/11 Time: 11:21
Sample: 1996 2006 IF EXPORTS>0 AND CHINAMAIN_GRAVITY >0
Periods included: 11
Cross-sections included: 51
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 443
Variable
C
LOG(CHINAMAIN_GRAVIT
Y)
COMMON_LANGUAGE
CORRUPTION_FREEDOM
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

3.780318

0.345790

10.93241

0.0000

0.381138
0.167408
0.029873

0.042481
0.357317
0.005371

8.972048
0.468515
5.561386

0.0000
0.6396
0.0000

0.296257
0.291448
2.431483
2595.415
-1020.187
61.60248
0.000000

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
Hannan-Quinn criter.
Durbin-Watson stat

4.882749
2.888586
4.623868
4.660830
4.638445
0.033963
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Table 3
Hong-Kong (Imports and Exports)
Dependent Variable: LOG(IMPORT)
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 05/05/11 Time: 11:16
Sample: 1996 2006 IF IMPORT>0 AND HONG_KONG_GRAVITY >0
Periods included: 10
Cross-sections included: 50
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 411
Variable
C
LOG(HONG_KONG_GRAVITY)
COMMON_LANGUAGE
CORRUPTION_FREEDOM
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

3.636822
0.428600
1.789665
0.057436

0.592899
0.113136
0.350627
0.004715

6.133961
3.788351
5.104181
12.18072

0.0000
0.0002
0.0000
0.0000

0.286546
0.281287
2.321121
2192.755
-927.2567
54.48814
0.000000

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
Hannan-Quinn criter.
Durbin-Watson stat

4.720929
2.737917
4.531663
4.570773
4.547134
0.216109

Dependent Variable: LOG(EXPORTS)
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 05/05/11 Time: 11:21
Sample: 1996 2006 IF EXPORTS>0 AND HONG_KONG_GRAVITY >0
Periods included: 10
Cross-sections included: 59
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 517
Variable
C
LOG(HONG_KONG_GRAVITY)
COMMON_LANGUAGE
CORRUPTION_FREEDOM
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

3.009180
0.253723
1.905036
0.052070

0.577401
0.110390
0.366515
0.004445

5.211594
2.298431
5.197700
11.71308

0.0000
0.0219
0.0000
0.0000

0.231276
0.226781
2.540472
3310.900
-1213.608
51.44665
0.000000

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
Hannan-Quinn criter.
Durbin-Watson stat

4.336435
2.889103
4.710284
4.743150
4.723162
0.157058
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Table 4

India (Imports and Exports)
Dependent Variable: LOG(IMPORT)
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 05/15/11 Time: 23:41
Sample: 1996 2006 IF IMPORT>0 AND INDIA_GRAVITY >0
Periods included: 9
Cross-sections included: 51
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 378
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

C
LOG(INDIA_GRAVITY)
COMMON_LANGUAGE
CORRUPTION_FREEDOM

1.504022
-0.033598
2.514542
0.056711

0.921123
0.202962
0.375127
0.005354

1.632815
-0.165536
6.703175
10.59302

0.1033
0.8686
0.0000
0.0000

R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

0.256814
0.250853
2.476823
2294.360
-877.1853
43.07959
0.000000

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
Hannan-Quinn criter.
Durbin-Watson stat

4.839122
2.861616
4.662356
4.703995
4.678882
0.315124

Dependent Variable: LOG(EXPORTS)
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 05/15/11 Time: 23:49
Sample: 1996 2006 IF EXPORTS>0 AND INDIA_GRAVITY >0
Periods included: 9
Cross-sections included: 59
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 469
Variable
C
LOG(INDIA_GRAVITY)
COMMON_LANGUAGE
CORRUPTION_FREEDOM
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

2.395304
0.114627
1.588391
0.050933

0.842363
0.187193
0.367974
0.004834

2.843553
0.612345
4.316585
10.53685

0.0047
0.5406
0.0000
0.0000

0.201833
0.196684
2.563221
3055.097
-1104.927
39.19504
0.000000

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
Hannan-Quinn criter.
Durbin-Watson stat

4.366290
2.859847
4.728899
4.764298
4.742827
0.277675
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Table 5
Malaysia (Imports and exports)
Dependent Variable: LOG(IMPORT)
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 05/15/11 Time: 23:41
Sample: 1996 2006 IF IMPORT>0 AND MALAYSIA_GRAVITY >0
Periods included: 11
Cross-sections included: 53
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 472
Variable
C
LOG(MALAYSIA_GRAVIT
Y)
COMMON_LANGUAGE
CORRUPTION_FREEDOM
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

2.019201

0.511394

3.948430

0.0001

0.066942
2.758684
0.056174

0.074095
0.317532
0.004786

0.903460
8.687882
11.73732

0.3667
0.0000
0.0000

0.261717
0.256984
2.469121
2853.189
-1094.353
55.30106
0.000000

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
Hannan-Quinn criter.
Durbin-Watson stat

4.880436
2.864464
4.654040
4.689268
4.667897
0.066046

Dependent Variable: LOG(EXPORTS)
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 05/15/11 Time: 23:49
Sample: 1996 2006 IF EXPORTS>0 AND MALAYSIA_GRAVITY >0
Periods included: 11
Cross-sections included: 61
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 590
Variable
C
LOG(MALAYSIA_GRAVIT
Y)
COMMON_LANGUAGE
CORRUPTION_FREEDOM
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

2.008525

0.452173

4.441943

0.0000

0.035759
1.933334
0.051983

0.068576
0.304370
0.004193

0.521450
6.351922
12.39752

0.6023
0.0000
0.0000

0.223465
0.219490
2.520246
3722.060
-1380.537
56.21151
0.000000

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
Hannan-Quinn criter.
Durbin-Watson stat

4.368470
2.852683
4.693346
4.723042
4.704915
0.046902

19
Table 6
Singapore (Imports and Exports)
Dependent Variable: LOG(IMPORT)
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 05/15/11 Time: 23:41
Sample: 1996 2006 IF IMPORT>0 AND SINGAPORE_GRAVITY >0
Periods included: 9
Cross-sections included: 52
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 387
Variable
C
LOG(SINGAPORE_GRAVITY)
COMMON_LANGUAGE
CORRUPTION_FREEDOM
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

7.938191
1.266086
2.026164
0.057905

1.198567
0.234488
0.362066
0.005078

6.623068
5.399370
5.596119
11.40284

0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

0.315284
0.309921
2.382579
2174.170
-883.1058
58.78543
0.000000

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
Hannan-Quinn criter.
Durbin-Watson stat

4.912377
2.868124
4.584526
4.625440
4.600750
0.367617

Dependent Variable: LOG(EXPORTS)
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 05/15/11 Time: 23:49
Sample: 1996 2006 IF EXPORTS>0 AND SINGAPORE_GRAVITY >0
Periods included: 9
Cross-sections included: 61
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 485
Variable
C
LOG(SINGAPORE_GRAVITY)
COMMON_LANGUAGE
CORRUPTION_FREEDOM
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
F-statistic

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

4.728037
0.575457
1.573438
0.051431

1.141354
0.220067
0.363867
0.004638

4.142482
2.614914
4.324212
11.08792

0.0000
0.0092
0.0000
0.0000

0.229677
0.224872
2.528338
3074.790
-1136.045
47.80438

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
Hannan-Quinn criter.
Durbin-Watson stat

4.358748
2.871762
4.701215
4.735723
4.714773
0.283548
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Table 7
Thailand (Imports and Exports)
Dependent Variable: LOG(IMPORT)
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 05/15/11 Time: 23:41
Sample: 1996 2006 IF IMPORT>0 AND THAILAND_GRAVITY >0
Periods included: 9
Cross-sections included: 52
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 388
Variable
C
LOG(THAILAND_GRAVIT
Y)
COMMON_LANGUAGE
CORRUPTION_FREEDOM
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

4.159648

1.173510

3.544622

0.0004

0.481931
2.434361
0.056892

0.214391
0.374067
0.005214

2.247913
6.507819
10.91239

0.0251
0.0000
0.0000

0.279750
0.274123
2.440217
2286.589
-894.6675
49.71597
0.000000

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
Hannan-Quinn criter.
Durbin-Watson stat

4.900034
2.864157
4.632307
4.673142
4.648497
0.160057

Dependent Variable: LOG(EXPORTS)
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 05/15/11 Time: 23:49
Sample: 1996 2006 IF EXPORTS>0 AND THAILAND_GRAVITY >0
Periods included: 9
Cross-sections included: 61
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 487
Variable
C
LOG(THAILAND_GRAVIT
Y)
COMMON_LANGUAGE
CORRUPTION_FREEDOM
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

2.293505

1.048033

2.188390

0.0291

0.105046
1.875596
0.052767

0.192715
0.361975
0.004687

0.545084
5.181568
11.25767

0.5859
0.0000
0.0000

0.225021
0.220207
2.546094
3131.094
-1144.146
46.74749
0.000000

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
Hannan-Quinn criter.
Durbin-Watson stat

4.327551
2.883267
4.715178
4.749578
4.728692
0.131982
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